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Abstract 
This paper investigates, whether including more corporate governance provisions or adding 
takeover defenses at annual shareholder meetings has a material impact on bond yield spreads. 
The analysis focuses on close call votes at annual shareholder meetings and uses a regression 
discontinuity design. This provides a clean estimate that accounts for the market expectations 
which form prior to the voting event and can therefore deliver more accurate estimates. I found 
that the bond yield spread increases by 0.29 percentage points if a governance proposal is 
passed but decreases by -1.77 percentage points if a takeover defense is added, after the voting 
percentage has surpassed the required threshold.  
Keywords: Regression discontinuity, Corporate Governance, Takeover defenses 
 3 
1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the effect corporate governance, implemented through shareholder 
voting, has on bond yield spreads, as a measure of bond returns. Using a discontinuous 
regression design (rdd), I will analyze different types of corporate governance and their impact 
on bond returns. Shareholder voting is used as the causal event, which triggers a change in 
corporate governance principles of a corporation. Corporate governance has been on the 
forefront of corporations’ agendas for over decades now. While this has not changed, the topics 
and their impact on firm performance have changed over time. The impact of corporate 
governance proposals on stakeholders of the firm changed accordingly. Research papers have 
been published about the effect of corporate governance on shareholder returns as well as bond 
returns. The most notable authors in this field are: Cunat, Gine and Guadalupe (2012), Cremers, 
Nair and Wei (2007) and Liu and Wu (2017), who also use a discontinuous regression design. 
Different corporate governance areas focus on various issues. The different approaches, 
can, largely be attributed to what the current issue is at the time. Later the decision is often 
reversed due to similar trends. For example, antitakeover protections were implemented in the 
early 1990s, amongst them, golden parachutes and high board remuneration, both of which 
were removed in the late 2000s. Therefore, the impacts of different governance mechanisms 
are controversial. Takeover defenses are commonly said to benefit bondholders, as they protect 
them from leverage increasing takeovers (Liu & Wu, 2017). On the other side, takeover 
defenses increase management entrenchment and allow executives to lead the firm inefficiently 
(Hart, 1983). 
The G-index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2001), separates firms into either the dictatorship 
or democracy portfolio. Certain governance frameworks distribute power to either the 
management or shareholders. The authors discover that governance delivers superior returns to 
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shareholders, as higher governance holds the management board more accountable and ensures 
that decisions are made in the best interest of shareholders.  Additional studies found that 
managers, if not disciplined by the possibility of takeovers or shareholders, start to enjoy “the 
quiet life” (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003), which results in lower firm performance. 
Therefore certain disciplining mechanisms are necessary, such as a threat of takeovers (Hart 
1983) to ensure executives work effectively to improve firm performance. The authors discover 
that increased competition reduces managerial slack to the benefit of stakeholders. The 
necessity for shareholders, as the most powerful stakeholders, to discipline management for the 
overall improvement of firm performance is titled the management disciplining hypothesis 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006). It essentially means that governance and 
shareholder activism work efficiently, in a value-creating way, to discipline and lead 
management in a direction that is beneficial for every stakeholder of the firm.  
As shareholders are the only direct owners and interest group of a firm, they will always 
direct management in such a way that it increases abnormal stock returns or benefits them in 
some other way in the short or long term. There are many other stakeholders of a firm, who 
intervene through other channels. Shareholders often use these channels as well. Institutional 
investors often try to intervene directly through management rather than by voting and only use 
proxy proposals as a last resort. Shareholder voting outcomes are typically non-binding for the 
management. Nonetheless, they are a very strong indication of the wishes of shareholders and 
often result in the successful implementation of the proposed task (Ertimur, Ferri, & Stubben, 
2010). Other stakeholders of the firm are affected by the decisions made by shareholders and 
have little impact on those decisions but often bear the consequences whether positive or 
negative. Bond prices and yield spreads are directly impacted by the firm characteristics and 
riskiness but creditors do not have the decision power to tilt the odds in their favor. According 
to the management disciplining hypothesis this should not be a problem, as shareholders merely 
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discipline the management and steer them in a direction which is beneficial for all stakeholders, 
also creditors (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006). 
An opposing theory, the wealth redistribution theory (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & 
LaFond, 2006), states that shareholders appropriate wealth from bondholders through their 
decision making and vote in such a way that it increases their own value to the detriment of the 
bondholders. Shareholders elect to increase the riskiness of the firm or undertake restructuring 
of business units, which destabilizes the firm. These actions can increase firm performance and 
deliver better returns for shareholders, but in the short-term bondholder returns are threatened. 
This phenomenon is titled asset substitution, where a firm presents a safe project to creditors 
when negotiating for loan contracts and then ex post exchanges the safe project for a riskier 
project. Hence, the riskiness and probability of default for the creditors increases, without any 
real compensation for the additional risk.  The firm value rises after the investment in a risky 
project, but as bondholders only receive a certain fixed amount in interest and principal 
payments they do not bear the benefits. Therefore, return performance is irrelevant to them past 
the point of covering their interest and principal payments. The effects on bondholders, 
following these actions, are an increased uncertainty and riskiness, which decreases bondholder 
value. In general, covenants are used to deter from such behavior and the expectation is that 
such potential behavior would be priced into the bond yield. However, the true probability is 
often difficult to determine.  
Evidence for both opposing arguments can be found in literature. On the one side, higher 
takeover defenses are useful for bondholders because a takeover involves a lot of change and 
uncertainty, which negatively impacts bond returns. It also means that if takeovers are unlikely, 
takeover prevention covenants are not required, which is more convenient for creditors. On the 
other side, takeovers improve management supervision and increase firm performance 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003) (Hart, 1983). This paper examines the different impacts that 
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governance topics have on bond yield spreads. Instead of looking at the G-index (Gompers, 
Ishii, & Metrick, 2001), I use an event study to analyze shareholder voting effects on corporate 
governance and their impact on bond performance. No research before has used an rdd approach 
to analyze the interaction of governance and bond yield spreads. This research can hopefully 
contribute to the existing literature by bringing more clarity into the market about how 
bondholders are influenced by decisions made by shareholders. Additionally, if firms better 
understood the impact a shareholder decision had on bondholders they could negotiate with 
bondholders to mitigate this effect to ensure the firm’s cost of debt does not increase for the 
next round of capital allocation.  Therefore, the research question of this study is:  
What is the effect of corporate governance implemented through shareholder voting on 
bond performance? 
Using shareholder voting data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and 
Riskmetrics as well as bond yield spreads from TRACE the research question is answered in 
favor of the wealth redistribution hypothesis. This research paper finds strong support that bond 
yield spreads decrease by -1.77 percentage points if a takeover provision is added by vote at 
the annual shareholder meeting, while yield spreads increase 0.29 percentage points if general 
governance mechanisms are added.  
2. Literature Review 
The main hypotheses, concerning corporate governance and bond performance, of scholars 
focus on two main theories, namely the wealth redistribution theory and the management 
disciplining hypothesis. The question is essentially, whether shareholder actions benefit or harm 
bondholders. This is tested in various studies, using different methodologies, such as 
regressions or discontinuous regressions. I will focus not only on the results in my discussion 
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but also on the methodologies, as it is an essential part of my own argument for why I chose a 
regression discontinuity design.  
2.1 Support for the Wealth Redistribution Theory  
One pair of authors, Liu and Wu (2017), examine the impact of corporate governance on 
the change in debt contracts by banks, according to the wealth redistribution theory. They find 
that the yield spread of bank debt, after antitakeover provisions are removed, is higher and bank 
debt contracts require stricter covenants. Otherwise, this indicates that the incentive to shift the 
risks towards bondholders, when striving for higher returns, increases and that the firm becomes 
more volatile after a narrow vote, as the firm is in a transitional period. Therefore, they 
effectively illustrate, that with the increase in shareholder empowerment the old bondholder-
shareholder conflicts are amplified and become costlier, for creditors. They use a regression 
discontinuity design, to analyze their theory. A rdd methodology is better able to distinguish 
between the effect that shareholder activism has on shareholder returns and noise in the returns, 
as it takes into account the expectations that the market forms prior to the voting event. Most 
studies implicitly or explicitly assume that the market does not form such expectations and 
instead reacts to the full extent once the event occurs. Thus, this rdd model is better suited for 
the market inherent behavioral patterns that are generally hard to observe, as it allows for a 
variation in expectations before the event and also takes into account the reaction a few days 
after the voting event. Liu and Wu (2017) limit their analysis to shareholder voting in relation 
to the removal of a takeover related G-index provision. Their argument is that takeovers are 
costly for debtors and often involve increased risk. Therefore, debtors, unlike shareholders, 
appreciate antitakeover protection provisions as they protect debtors from the risks involved in 
a change of ownership and thus punish the removal of such provisions with more covenants 
and higher yield spreads.  
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Cremers, et al. (2007) study a similar issue, the authors measure corporate governance 
by utilizing several factors defined in the G-index (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2001), and tested 
the impact of institutional blockholders, takeover defense provisions, and the G-index itself. 
Cremers et al. (2007) find that blockholders and weak takeover defenses negatively impact 
bondholders and usually increase the number of covenants as well as bond spreads. This, 
illustrates the point that bondholders value strong takeover defenses, as the change of ownership 
often makes a firm more volatile. A takeover typically results in restructuring of assets, and 
increased debt, which alters the seniority of debt and at the same time diminishes the asset base 
which serves as collateral for many debt instruments. The risk of default increases often after a 
takeover, if the debt has not been restructured. Thus, to add extra protection debtholders include 
covenants which secure their interests, should a takeover occur. The increased riskiness is also 
represented by an increase in bond spreads. Antitakeover repeal proposals inherently exhibit 
conflicts of interest, as management is reluctant to change their antitakeover protection, because 
it increases their risk of being dismissed. Consequently, the interests of management and 
bondholders are aligned on these issues and oppose those of shareholders.  
Another study by Klock Mansi and Maxwell (2005) examines the impact of 
antitakeover provisions on cost of debt financing and the authors make a similar argument as 
Cremers et al. (2007), namely that takeovers are threatening to bondholders in various ways. 
They list as possible reasons: a revocation of promise from management to recapitalize the firm, 
increase shareholder pay-outs, and to pay-out excess liquid assets and focus the firm through 
divestures and spin-offs. All these factors reduce the liquidity and collateral of the firm and 
therefore increase the risk of default for bondholders. Especially hostile takeovers are said to 
be harmful for bondholders. The authors mention two competing hypotheses, which they aim 
to test in their research, namely the shareholder interest hypothesis and the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis (Klock, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2005). The first hypothesis argues that 
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takeover defenses increase the price of sale and therefore benefit all shareholders, whereas the 
management entrenchment hypothesis argues that antitakeover defenses induce management to 
indulge in opportunistic behavior. Their data indicates that firms with stronger management 
rights, and therefore strong antitakeover provisions have lower cost of debt financing and firms 
with stronger shareholder rights, and less antitakeover provisions have higher cost of debt 
financing. They go on to argue, that there is an agency cost of debt, which mainly results from 
different interest between shareholders and bondholders. Otherwise shareholders require 
monitoring, enforcing, credibility, and constraints on the side of the bondholder. If these actions 
are not undertaken bondholders often face an expropriation of wealth from shareholders which 
then invest in higher risk projects than previously held within the firm. This leads to a higher 
risk for bondholders with a larger upside potential only captured by shareholders. Therefore, 
covenants and other monitoring instruments are used to prevent shareholders from acting in 
their sole interest and mitigate these risks.  
Klock et al. (2007) find in their regression testing that the results are in line with the 
shareholder interest hypothesis, meaning firms with strong management rights and weak 
governance have lower cost of debt financing. Finally, they conclude, that the negative relation 
between governance and spreads is larger within firms with more takeover defenses and this in 
turn indicates that “hostile takeovers could be partially financed by expropriating bondholder’s 
wealth” Klock et al. (2005). Accordingly, governance provisions that give more power to 
shareholders enable them to take away wealth from bondholders. These studies all focus on the 
wealth redistribution hypothesis and manage to find support for this theory. There are various 
additional research articles on this topic, however due to spatial constraints I selected the three 
most important articles, in relation to my research.  
Following the research studies, the first hypothesis posed in this study therefore is the 
effect of corporate governance on bond yield spreads, which according to the wealth 
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redistribution hypothesis should decrease bondholder value for each addition of a governance 
mechanism.  
H1a: Adding a corporate governance provision through shareholder voting increases bond 
yield spreads. 
To go into more detail, it was suggested by Liu & Wu (2017), that takeover defenses 
have a particularly strong effect on bondholders, as decreased takeover defenses promise more 
uncertainty and volatility in the future, and lower bond returns. I have modified the data to show 
an addition of antitakeover protection, because certain observation added or removed 
antitakeover provisions. Therefore, the second hypothesis arises to test if the addition of a 
takeover defense has a particularly strong effect in isolation.  
H2a: An increase in takeover defenses through shareholder voting decreases bond yield 
spreads. 
2.2 Support for the Management Disciplining Hypothesis 
According to Hart (1983) a competitive market reduces management slack, which 
means that certain mechanisms are beneficial to align executives with shareholders as well as 
bondholders. They separate between two types of firms, entrepreneurial companies and 
managerial firms. While entrepreneurial firms are run in the interest of their owners, 
managerial firms are run in the interest of their managers. Under the assumption that 
entrepreneurial firms perfectly incentivize and discipline managers there are still certain 
factors, which can be improved by increased competition. Firm owners are rarely aware of the 
underlying input costs, which are relevant for firms, thus even under ideal supervision 
shareholders might not be aware of certain managerial slack, as long as profit expectations are 
met. Therefore, this research article delivers meaningful results supporting the management 
disciplining hypothesis. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) also find evidence that if managers 
are potected from takeovers they enjoy the quiet life, by driving less extreme wage negotiations 
 11 
and paying generally higher input costs, while investing less. The authors argue that a certain 
threat of takeovers and corporate governance are neccesary to incentivize executives to take 
action and actively manage the firm.  These two studies therefore show, that management often 
needs to be disciplined to ensure better firm performace.  
Following the management disciplining hypothesis, the interaction effect for both 
hypotheses would reverse. So, the inclusion of corporate governance mechanisms as well as 
the addition of antitakeover protection would benefit or harm bondholder returns and decrease 
or increase bond yield spreads respectively. Hypotheses 1b and 2b are therefore.  
H1b:  Adding a corporate governance provision through shareholder voting decreases 
bond yield spreads 
H2b: An addition in takeover defenses through shareholder voting increases bond yield 
spreads. 
3. Methodology  
In order to conduct the analysis, the data is retrieved from the database WRDS and uses 
values from Riskmetrics and ISS data about shareholder voting, as well as bond yields 
originating from TRACE. I modify the bond yields into spreads by taking the difference of the 
firms’ bond yields and the US Treasury yield on the same day with the same maturity as the 
firms’ bonds. The timeframe used in my model is 2006 to 2017, which provides a large enough 
dataset to obtain significant results. In total, I receive 24.068 data points of individual 
shareholder proposals, which then condensed down based on the matching of available bond 
data and the 10% distance of vote shares from the passing threshold results in 1512 proposals. 
Matching these voting outcomes to all outstanding bonds of each company at the voting dates 
yields 18,957 individual observations. The model assumes that shareholder voting outcomes 
can be priced into the market if the outcome of the vote is clear. To illustrate this effect, I 
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develop a model similar to what Cunat et al. (2012) present in their paper to explain different 
shareholder expectations.  
I modify this model to fit to bondholder expectations (Figure 1). The vote share percentage 
at shareholder meetings is measured as 𝑣 which represent votes passed in favour of a proposal. 
If 𝑣 ≥ 0.5 then the proposal will be implemented with certainty and the value to the 
bondholders becomes 𝐵(𝑣) = 𝐵, where 𝐵<0. My data includes votes with a threshold of either 
50% or 66% so accordingly with an interval of either 40-60% or 56-76%. In the following I 
will take the majority threshold as an example of my explanation, but the theory stays the same 
with a 66% threshold. For the basis of this research an assumption is made that the probability 
and value to bondholders is discrete, for the model to deliver meaningful results. The value to 
bondholders if a proposal is not approved anywhere between 0 ≤ 𝑣 < 0.5 remains unchanged 
at 𝐵(𝑣) = 0, however if the proposal is passed for values of 0.5 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 1 the value to the 
bondholders decreases, as the governance proposal passed by shareholders is wealth 
expropriating, according to hypotheses 1a and 2a, and therefore the value to bondholders 
decreases to 𝐵(𝑣) = 𝐵. This discrete change in value to the bondholders is what I aim to 
measure with my regression discontinuity design. The total change is not clearly observable in 
the market, because bondholders form previous opinions about the voting outcomes and its 
impact on the firm, which is taken into account in bond prices even before the vote has been 
cast. The market manages to relatively accurately predict the changes in voting outcomes at the 
firm level if the votes are relatively clear cut from the start, the more the voting share moves 
towards the middle the more uncertain the market reaction. Therefore, my figure includes a 
second line which depicts the expectations of bondholders in the market and therefore decreases 
as 𝑣 increases.  
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The market expectations are modelled by 𝐸(𝐵|𝑣). The excess return observable and usable 
in my model is therefore the difference between the value to bondholders 𝐵(𝑣) and the 
expectations made by bondholders. 𝑋(𝑣) = 𝐵(𝑣) − 𝐸(𝐵|𝑣)  shows the actual excess return in 
the market. 𝑋(𝑣) is zero when the vote shares are very large or very small, because at both ends 
of the scale the outcome is clear. However, the closer the vote share gets to the 0.5 mark the 
more uncertainty exists. Therefore, the predictions of the market become more imprecise and 
the excess return for close call votes is therefore more noticeable on the day of the vote. Because 
at 𝑣 ≈ 0.5, 𝐸(𝐵|𝑣) ≈ 0.5 𝐵. The expectation of the value to bondholders is continuous with 
𝐸(𝐵|𝑣), however the value to bondholders itself 𝐵(𝑣) is discontinuous and changes discretely 
when the vote percentage has surpassed the 0.5 mark. Therefore, the abnormal returns 
observable when the results are published are also discontinuous at the majority threshold 
(Cunat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2012). The difference between the abnormal returns for a proposal 
that narrowly passes and one that narrowly fails is equal to the value of the proposal to 
bondholders. I can conclude 𝑋 = (𝐵 − 𝐸(𝐵|𝑣)) − (0 − 𝐸(𝐵|𝑣)) = 𝐵. Thus, the total value of 
the proposal to bondholders can be deducted from the difference in abnormal returns of close 
call votes around the discontinuity. The value to bondholders is hard to measure and I will use 
bond yield spreads as a measure of bondholder excess return. Here, the plotted effect would 
reverse, when compared to figure 1, as a higher yield means less value for bondholders and a 
lower yield indicates more value captured by bondholders. Therefore, the jump in the model 
should be positive, as I suspect that the value to bondholders decreases ex post a passed 
corporate governance proposal. So, the yield should increase.  
There are three critical assumptions. Firstly, the firm characteristics have to be random and 
be the same on average on both sides of the discontinuity (Assumption 1), meaning that there 
is no significant difference in firm characteristics or voting expectations which weigh the vote 
in one or the other direction and thus indirectly interact with the regression analysis. Secondly, 
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the voting expectations cannot differ significantly on either side of the majority threshold, as 
this would mean different base assumptions which would negate the expressiveness of the 
analysis (Assumption 2). Thirdly, once a vote is passed the probability of implementation 
increases as opposed to previous expectations before the vote and is significantly different from 
the changed probability of implementation if the vote did not pass (Assumption 3). The 
expectations of outcomes are roughly the same before the votes, as the expectation lies around 
the majority threshold. Because shareholder voting is not binding for the management, some 
proposals are passed, yet never implemented by management. Consequently, the effect to the 
bondholders is mitigated by this knowledge and would be stronger if the proposal was binding, 
meaning the proposal would be implemented with certainty and accordingly impact the 
bondholders to the full extent. Therefore, 𝐵(𝑣) to the right of the threshold is not as negative 
as it would be otherwise and slightly more negative to the left of the majority threshold.  
This effect might even be more pronounced with regards to close call votes, as in that case 
management has a better reason to deter from the voting outcome, as the vote is so close to the 
passing threshold, meaning they can decide the implementation of the proposal at their own 
discretion. Additionally, 𝐵(𝑣) could include the probability of future proposals being passed 
and submitted. As the probability of success increases incrementally with each proposal being 
passed by shareholders. Therefore, 𝐸(𝐵|𝑣) will most likely also contain this expectation, 
making the expectations of bondholders’ returns asymmetrical around the majority threshold. 
This factor does not negate the research, as long as 𝐸(𝐵|𝑣) is continuous and the probability of 
implementation is discontinuous, 𝑋 can be used to measure the value to bondholders. The only 
factor that changes with these different assumptions is that 𝑋 ≠ 𝐵. To truly get the value of 𝐵, 
X should include the new founded expectations of implementation of a proposal as well as the 
proposing and passing of future proposals and their effect on bondholders. For all these reasons 
 15 
a regular regression analysis would not work in this particular context and therefore a 
discontinuity regression design is more expressive.  
I start with my model by assuming that there is the shareholder voting event, on a 
governance issue 𝐴 in a firm 𝑓, which is at time 𝑡, which can influence the bond yield of an 
outstanding loan 𝑦𝑓,𝑡+𝜏 . The votes passed in favour of the proposal are represented by 𝑣𝑓𝑡
𝐴 . If 
𝑣𝑓𝑡
𝐴  surpasses the threshold of 50% (66%) of votes, then the dummy variable 𝐷𝑓𝑡 = 1. 𝜀𝑓,𝑡𝜏 
represents the error term. If my assumption of the unpredictability of voting outcomes for those 
narrow votes holds, then the variable describing the left-hand side of the votes, so below the 
passing requirement should have a different polynomial property and a different coefficient 
than the variable describing vote shares above the threshold. This is expressed by the factors 
𝑓𝑙(∑ 𝑣𝑓𝑡
𝐴 , 𝛾𝜏
𝐴,𝑙𝑁
𝐴=1 ) and 𝑓𝑟(∑ 𝑣𝑓𝑡
𝐴 , 𝛾𝜏
𝐴,𝑟𝑁
𝐴=1 ) Additionally, the expression needs to account for lag 
of the response which could occur several days after the vote took place and therefore  will 
analyze the market reaction at time 𝑡 + 𝜏. The variable 𝜏 can take a value of up to five days 
after the voting event. As most of the effect should have been fully realized by then. Therefore, 
as the vote takes place at time 𝑡 the impact will be realized between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝜏. 
This equation employs a regression discontinuity design, as it is the best design for this 
particular event study to include prior expectations, as well as a lag in reaction to the event and 
takes into account the break in expectations around the threshold. The model requires several 
dummy variables. 𝜎𝑡 is a dummy variable for the calendar year, while 𝜆𝑓𝑡 refers to firm specific 
characteristics, such as age, firm size, leverage, RoA and other control variables. According to 
Assumption 1, these control variables should not be necessary, but to ensure no interference 
from interaction variables I include these in my model. The coefficients 𝛽𝜏, 𝛾𝜏
𝑙and 𝛾𝜏
𝑟 can be 
either negative or positive for 𝜏 > 1 and are 0 for 𝜏 = 0. Presumably, the parameters would be 
positive for general governance provisions and negative for takeover defense provisions, 
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indicating a decrease in bond yield spreads. I presume that most of the bond price reaction will 
be captured at day 𝑡. Therefore, the final formula yields: 
(1)             𝑦𝑓,𝑡+𝜏 = 𝛽
𝜏 ∑ 𝐷𝑓𝑡
𝐴𝑁
𝐴=1 + [𝑓𝑙(∑ 𝑣𝑓𝑡
𝐴 , 𝛾𝜏
𝐴,𝑙𝑁
𝐴=1 ) + 𝑓𝑟(∑ 𝑣𝑓𝑡
𝐴 , 𝛾𝜏
𝐴,𝑟𝑁
𝐴=1 )] + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡𝜏. 
This equation therefore shows the average effect of all governance proposals within one 
firm for a certain meeting date. I will use this expression first for all types of governance 
proposals but then limit A to only antitakeover provisions. The model aggregates all firm 
specific bond returns after different governance proposals and then plots a line for best fit of 
bond returns in relation to voting share as an output of this discontinuous regression model.  
4. Analysis 
First, the data is analyzed for goodness of fit and general descriptive tendencies. The 
descriptive statistics show, that the distribution of companies across years is right skewed. 
Showing that most votes fail by a small margin rather than passing. Figure 2 also shows that 
for certain vote spreads there are very few data points. This would be a limitation to the data, 
as there is an unequal amount of data points on both sides of the threshold, however due to the 
large amount of data overall this should not prove to be an issue. There is a large variance from 
vote spread to vote spread, with over 2500 observations displaying a vote spread of -10% to -
9% from their threshold, while only roughly 30 observations show a vote spread of +9% to 
+10% away from the passing threshold.  The data seems to prove the point that more votes fail 
at annual general meetings than pass and that because of this, prior expectations could be 
formed, which expect the failing of a vote by default, influencing assumption 2. When 
inspecting the frequency distribution of firms over the years it can be observed, that the most 
votes occur in 2009 and 2010 (Figure 3). There are also a lot of votes in the year 2008, which 
can be justified by the financial crisis. The most amount of uncertainty and necessity for change 
was during this time, therefore it seems reasonable that a lot of votes were proposed during 
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those turbulent times. Votes are more likely to pass if the company is under duress, because the 
shareholder would like to see a turnaround, leading the company into prosperity and security 
again.  
To ensure that all interaction variables are indeed non-influential on the regression outcome, 
the data is tested for correlation and difference in means for the sample that passed the proposal 
and for the sample, which rejected the proposal. The correlation matrix (Figure 4) shows, that 
the control variables are not strongly correlated to the yield spread on day t=0 and all controls 
float around zero correlation, indicating no correlation between yield spread and the control 
variables. Therefore, I can conclude that the yield spread is indeed independent of the control 
variables. Here, it can also be observed that variables which relate to each other are strongly 
correlated. For example, the Debt to Equity ratio is negatively correlated to the z-score, 
indicating that a larger debt ratio increases the likelihood of bankruptcy.  Alternatively, Return 
on Equity is positively correlated with the z-score, a higher return makes the company saver. 
These factors are also part of the calculation of the z-score factors. Even though the control 
variables interact with each other, there is no evidence to suggest they interact with our 
observations. Another test, which compares the mean of the control variables for the sample 
where a proposal passes to firms where a proposal is rejected, shows that on average the firms 
where a proposal passes, return worse values for the control variables, indicating riskier firm 
characteristics (Figure 5). The z-score for firms where a proposal passes seems to be lower, this 
is also the case for Return on Equity, Return on Assets and Market to Book value. While the 
Debt to Equity ratio is higher, indicating proposals pass for firms with a worse return rate and 
higher debt. A possible explanation could be that these worse performing and riskier firms have 
a higher need to alter their governance and firm performance and thus the proposals are more 
likely to pass than for firms where the performance seems to be doing better, implicitly 
influencing assumption 2 as well as 1. The asset base and EBITDA as well as CAPEX 
 18 
performance cannot be compared to each other, as the companies all have different sizes and 
products. Hence no conclusions can be derived from this data. The ratios previously mentioned 
are comparable, as they show relative performance measures which can be compared between 
firms. There are still some natural differences due to for example product base, as an IT 
company has less assets than a food manufacturer for example, simply due to the nature of their 
product base. But under the assumption that those types of firms are evenly spread over the 
sample it is unlikely that this is the deciding factor in the difference in performance measures 
for companies where the proposals pass compared to companies where the proposals fail. The 
difference in performance measures is not large enough to conclude anything about the firm 
characteristics in absolute terms and therefore the analysis is continued, without correcting for 
those control variables. When coming to the main analysis, the relationship between all 
corporate governance proposal voting outcomes and the yield spread is examined first, to test 
hypotheses 1a and 1b. The output shows that the model exhibits a discontinuity which is 
strongly significant at the 1% level and leads to an estimated jump in the regression of 0.29 
(Figure 6 & 7). this means the yield spread increases by 0.29 percentage points once a corporate 
governance related vote has passed, indicating that passing additional governance proposals in 
a company increases the yield spread and in turn means a value loss for bondholders. The results 
are robust at a 5% distance away from the threshold and at a 2 % distance away from the passing 
threshold. The effect amplifies the smaller the observation window becomes. This supports the 
logic for a rd design, as the market can seemingly predict the voting outcome beforehand, thus 
the reaction becomes less visible, the larger the voting bandwidth, is away from the passing 
threshold. The adjusted R squared also improves as the bandwidth becomes smaller from 0.09 
to 0.83 for a 10% bandwidth compared to a 2% bandwidth respectively.  This test therefore is 
proof for hypothesis 1a and rejects hypothesis 1b. The passing of a corporate governance 
proposal indicates a positive jump in bond yield spreads, in turn decreasing the value to 
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bondholders.  This analysis focuses on all general governance provisions but does not 
particularly relate to any specific type of governance proposal. Therefore, hypotheses 2a and 
2b are tested next to see if takeover defenses have an amplifying effect on bond yield spreads 
when compared to general governance provisions or not. Here, the drop at the cut-off point is 
clearly visible. The yield spread decreases drastically at the threshold and remains at a lower 
level throughout the data points for all passed proposals (Figure 9). This is therefore proof, for 
hypothesis 2a and rejects hypothesis 2b. There is a quantifiable advantage of adding takeover 
defenses to a firm for bondholders. What is additionally interesting to observe is that the yield 
spread seems to increase at the line of best fit for proposals which fail by a small margin, 
possibly to punish or show the disagreement of bondholders with this decision. The test for 
discontinuity here shows, that the yield spread increases significantly at the 1% level. The 
amount of this advantage is -1.77 (Figure 8) percentage points by which the bond yield spread 
is lowered. Again, these estimates are robust at smaller bandwidths and the effect amplifies to 
a -2.19 percentage points decrease in yield spread for an addition in takeover defenses. The 
adjusted R squared which indicates the fit of the model also improves drastically from 0.02 to 
0.88 for the 2% bandwidth sample. This research paper in conclusion only found support for 
the wealth redistribution theory, as both hypotheses support this theory, while the other two 
hypotheses in support of the management disciplining hypothesis had to be rejected. These 
results were robust at the 1% level and when reducing the bandwidth to 5% on either side of 
the threshold or 2% on either side of the threshold the effect only becomes stronger.  
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5. Discussion 
In general, I can conclude, a small jump in the regression discontinuity design is observable 
at the cut-off point for corporate governance related proposals. This effect reverses when 
looking at takeover defenses. The control variables show no significant interaction with the 
yield and therefore this jump in yield spreads at the threshold must stem from the change in 
expectations due to a decision made at the voting date. This is a sign that the addition of 
takeover defenses in governance provision decreases the yield spread and increases bondholder 
returns, at least in the short term. The findings therefore entirely support the wealth 
redistribution hypothesis while there was no evidence in support of the management 
disciplining hypothesis. This paper contains some natural limitations. Proposals and voting 
decisions of shareholders are non-binding for management and accordingly an accepted 
proposal does not translate to an automatic implementation of the proposal. Especially around 
close call votes the likelihood of a proposal not being implemented if it has 51% of the votes is 
more justifiable by management than for a proposal which was accepted with an overwhelming 
majority. Similarly, a proposal which just failed might still be implemented by management. 
Thus, the true reaction of bondholders to a proposal cannot be captured entirely by this 
methodology. The jump in yield spreads also includes some of the effect that the passing of one 
vote increases the likelihood of future votes passing, thus including additional governance 
mechanisms later on. Therefore, the jump in yield spreads includes this probability which is 
also hard to quantify or remove. An additional limitation of this research methodology is the 
endogeneity issue which arises between the dependent variable and the error term in the model. 
This means, that the dependent variable, in this case, yield spread could be correlated to the 
error term instead of the vote spread variable. This endogeneity relation would deliver 
significant results. The outcome would not be proof for a relationship between voting outcome 
and yield spread, but instead some unknown variable which is unrelated to the voting outcome. 
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All possible interaction variables were tested for correlation and change before and after a 
voting event and no significant interaction was found. Therefore, it seems unlikely that an 
interaction term between the dependent variable and the error term arises in this research study. 
The possibility of such an impact, however, can never be fully excluded.  
I only look at US firms and use a period which is turbulent in terms of general market 
performance, despite correcting for external market factors by using yield spreads, the reaction 
might be more or less sensitive to firm specific actions, depending on the underlying market 
conditions. Further research could also focus on the effect ownership segmentation of 
institutional or inside investors has on the interaction effect between corporate governance and 
yield spread. Inside owners might have different interest in a firm and steer the company in a 
very different direction than most other institutional investors would. Another factor would be 
to look at the effect of sponsor identity to analyze, if there is a difference in outcome if the 
proposal is sponsored by an individual versus an institution. The logic behind this being that an 
institution will most likely approach management with their proposal directly before bringing 
it to a vote and will only issue a shareholder proposal if the idea was met with resistance by the 
management. Therefore, the proposal could potentially have a more disruptive effect on the 
firm and worsen the impact on bondholders. Lastly, I would be curious to see if the effect might 
be stronger for the bonds with the highest yields versus those with the lowest yield in a firm, as 
the lower yield bonds are most likely more senior and therefore better protected from harsh 
firm actions, whereas bonds with higher yields would be less protected and their reaction to a 
change in governance provisions might be more drastic, as it impacts those bondholders more 
strongly.  In general, I found strong evidence for the support of the wealth redistribution 
hypothesis.  Further research is required to strengthen and reconfirm this relationship. However, 
I hope to have made a case for future research which needs to explore the topic of bondholder 
value and its implications.  
 22 
6. References 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., & LaFond, R. (2006). The effects of corporate 
governance on firms' credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42, 203-
243. 
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and 
Managerial Preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043-1075. 
Cremers, K. J., Nair, V. B., & Wei, C. (2007). Governance Mechnisms and Bond Prices. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 20(5), 1359-1388. 
Cunat, V., Gine, M., & Guadalupe, M. (2012). The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate 
Governance on Shareholder Value. The Journal of Finance, 1943-1977. 
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Stubben, S. R. (2010). Board of directors' responsiveness to 
shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
16(1), 53-72. 
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2001). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. 
NBER Working Paper Series(8449), 70. 
Hart, O. D. (1983). The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 14(2), 366-382. 
Klein, A., & Zur, E. (2011). The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm's 
Existing Bondholders. The Review of Financial Studies, 24, 1735-1771. 
Klock, M. S., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2005). Does Corporate Governance Matter to 
Bondholders? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40(4), 693-719. 
Liu, Y., & Wu, X. (2017). Shareholder Activism, Internal Corporare Governance and the Cost 
of Bank Loans. SSRN, 49.  
 23 
7. Appendix 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of firms with spread of vote differences  
 
 
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative 
2006 1,121 5.90% 5.90% 
2007 994 5.23% 11.13% 
2008 2,234 11.75% 22.88% 
2009 4,597 24.19% 47.07% 
2010 4,482 23.58% 70.65% 
2011 1,305 6.87% 77.52% 
2012 939 4.94% 82.46% 
2013 635 3.34% 85.80% 
2014 55 0.29% 86.09% 
2015 1,184 6.23% 92.32% 
2016 903 4.75% 97.07% 
2017 557 2.93% 100.00% 
Total 19,006 100%  
 
 
Figure 3: Frequency of observations per year 
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Figure 1: Bond returns in Reaction to Vote Share
E(B|v). 
B(v)
X(v)= B(v)-E(B|v)
Figure 1: Market expectations and excess return development across vote percentages
�
0
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Figure 4: Correlation matrix of yield spread and control variables 
 
Figure 5: Means for control variables in firms with passed and rejected proposals 
Governance 
10% Threshold 5% Threshold 2% Threshold 
(1) (2) (3) 
RD Estimate 0.2932*** 0.4347*** 1.5796*** 
p-value 8.39E-10 3.16E-16 2.20E-16 
Adjusted R squared 0.0935 0.1273 0.8166 
    
Clustered NO NO NO 
Linear YES YES YES 
Firm Controls NO NO NO 
Observations 18,957 8,430 3,106 
Figure 6: Regression output CG yield per vote spread for different thresholds 
Mean Std. Error
Vote Rejected 6.82 0.42 5.99 7.65
Vote Passed 5.00 0.55 4.58 6.73
Vote Rejected 3.15 0.11 2.94 3.36
Vote Passed 2.97 0.17 2.65 3.29
Vote Rejected 4.36 0.30 3.76 4.96
Vote Passed 3.51 0.28 2.95 4.06
Vote Rejected 4.36 0.30 3.76 4.96
Vote Passed 3.51 0.28 2.95 4.06
Vote Rejected 64345.93 5143.84 54235.06 74456.80
Vote Passed 38023.56 4043.27 30075.43 45971.14
Vote Rejected 72872.31 5106.00 62834.80 82907.82
Vote Passed 37007.45 3558.67 30082.43 44072.47
Vote Rejected 20.53 1.47 17.64 23.43
Vote Passed 15.10 1.90 11.37 18.83
Vote Rejected 9455.18 717.68 8044.49 10865.87
Vote Passed 5302.89 631.78 4061.05 6544.73
Vote Rejected 3308.98 311.15 2697.38 3920.58
Vote Passed 2808.54 445.50 1932.85 3684.23
RoA
Z-Score
Market to Book
Debt to Equity
Market value
Return on Equity
EBITDA
Capex
95% Conf. Interval
Assets
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Figure 7: Graph of CG yield per vote spread 
 
Antitakeover 
Protection 
10% Threshold 5% Threshold 2% Threshold 
(1) (2) (3) 
RD Estimate -1.769*** -1.996*** -2.187*** 
p-value 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 
Adjusted R squared 0.0147 0.4680 0.8764 
    
Clustered NO NO NO 
Linear YES YES YES 
Firm Controls NO NO NO 
Observations 6,738 4,287 1,604 
Figure 8: Regression output Takeover defense addition yield per vote spread for different 
thresholds 
 
Figure 9: Graph of Takeover defense addition yield per vote spread 
